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The outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease that occurred in Hereford, West Midlands UK in 2003
was the single largest outbreak of Legionnaires’ in Hereford and one of the first to
challenge the newly formed Health Protection Agency. This was, de facto a ‘public health
incident’ requiring not only the investigation and management of a community outbreak of
infectious disease, but also one that had to take into account other issues including:
uncertainty regarding roles and responsibilities, political considerations and communica-
tion needs including sustained media attention. The incident also demonstrated the
‘added value’ of an integrated health protection response. The practical lessons learned
from outbreaks are rarely described, particularly operational aspects. This paper
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In late October 2003 the Consultant in Communicable
Disease Control (CCDC) for Herefordshire was informed of
a case of Legionnaires’ disease (LD) in an elderly man from
Hereford City. Three days later, on 27 October the local
laboratory reported a further case. On 6 November, as a
result of active case-finding, two further cases were
identified. A multidisciplinary Outbreak Control Team
(OCT) was convened that day to formally declare an
outbreak, define the magnitude of the outbreak, prevent
further transmission and investigate the source of infection.
Intensive case finding, microbiological and environmental
investigation and the use of a geographic information system
(GIS) identified the likely source as one of two cooling towers
at a local factory which was used on a seasonal basis. There
were 28 associated cases and two deaths before cleansing
and closure of the cooling towers on 12 November 2003. A
condensed chronology of events is provided in Appendix A.
LD is an environmentally acquired bacterial pneumonia
caused by Legionella species, which are widely distributed in
man-made and natural environments.1,2 Transmission of the
disease may, in susceptible people, follow inhalation
of Legionella contaminated aerosol.3 Documented sources of
contaminated aerosols include cooling towers, fountains,
showers, water taps and whirlpool spas.4–9 Reports of LD can
cause great alarm in the community and intense media
attention with pressure on public health officials to identify
the cause and institute remedial action. Indeed, previously
published accounts of outbreaks of LD have focused on
identifying the source of the outbreak and the control
measures instituted.7,10,11 Although important, such reports
rarely describe the practicalities involved in managing and
coordinating a major outbreak, or the responses of the
organisations involved.
The largest Legionnaires’ outbreak ever recorded in the
UK occurred in the summer of 2002 with over 170 laboratory
confirmed cases of LD and illustrates the need for sharing
lessons identified from outbreak investigations.12,13 The
outbreak was caused by a contaminated ventilation plant in
the town centre and led to the hospitalisation of approxi-
mately 500 suspected cases over a 10-day period.12 This
posed considerable clinical and public health challenges and
placed a significant strain on healthcare services. Although a
single organisation was not leading the outbreak response,
local public health organisations retained overall control
and responsibility while receiving significant support from
local and national agencies.13 Valuable lessons identified
from this outbreak included: the need for good surveillance
and health intelligence; the limitations of major incident
plans and the value of the multidisciplinary approach.13
In the UK responsibility for protecting the health of the
population rests with Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). However in
April 2003 the HPA was formed to provide advice and support
to PCTs to deal with the surveillance and investigation ofinfectious and non-infectious environmental hazards. In
effect, the specialist health protection teams that had
resided within PCTs up to that date moved into and largely
formed the local Health Protection Agency (HPA). This posed
some organisational challenges as both the PCT and HPA
clarified their roles and responsibilities.
The Hereford LD outbreak of November 2003 was one of
the first large community outbreaks to challenge the newly
formed HPA both in its expert role, and in the way local and
regional HPA teams worked as part of the new ‘public health
system’ in England and Wales.14,15 During a major incident,
emergency, or large outbreak the formation of a multi-
disciplinary incident or outbreak team is standard practice
with the lead agency being determined by the nature of the
incident. Where the incident is focussed on health the
incident team is traditionally chaired by a Director of Public
Health (DPH) from the PCT. However, in this incident the
new health protection arrangements prompted a different
management structure.
The scale of this outbreak and its impact on the economy
of Hereford city centre not only stimulated debate about
the role and responsibilities of the different agencies
involved in the response but also about public expectations
regarding health protection and the strategies to be adopted
by the Agency for future outbreaks.Lessons learned
Media, political and public interest was intense for several
weeks following declaration of the outbreak on 6 November
and required rigorous and sustained handling. The resource
and expertise to achieve this, and to manage the outbreak
needed a collaborative effort between the local and
neighbouring Health Protection Unit (HPU) teams, the HPA
Regional Surveillance Unit (RSU), the PCT, the Strategic
Health Authority (SHA), the Regional DPH (RDPH), the Local
Authority (LA), and two central HPA divisions (Centre for
Infections (CfI) and Porton Down). This incident served to
illustrate that outbreaks can be complex, unpredictable
events and that while existing structures are fundamentally
sound they need to be flexible enough to cope with sudden
and unexpectedly large events.
The methodology used in this paper to describe the
lessons learned is based upon the observations, personal
experiences and perspectives of local personnel directly
involved in the outbreak. Once the outbreak was concluded
a formal lessons learned exercise was conducted in addition
to the standard debrief within the OCT. This employed root
cause analysis16 to systematically collect and map informa-
tion and involved a questionnaire survey of those who
managed the outbreak, the company at the source of the
outbreak, local businesses politicians and the media.
Although general guidelines on the management of out-
breaks are available, as are LD outbreak reports,10,11,17–20
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The purpose of this paper is to summarise the outbreak,
outline specific elements of the response and identify the main
learning points for the new agency and its partners. A number
of these lessons have a generic applicability to the handling of
public health incidents and are summarised under the
following topic headings (these are not in order of priority): Organisation and coordination.
 Surveillance.
 Investigation.
 Control and prevention.
 Roles and responsibilities.
 Engagement with partners.
 Communications.
 Political considerations.
 Intelligence and information management.
 Surge capacity.Organisation and coordination
In an outbreak situation the chain of command must be clear to
all concerned and is of particular importance where many
agencies are involved. For this incident, command structure and
responsibilities followed the ‘Gold–Silver–Bronze’ arrangement
for dealing with significant incidents.21 In this hierarchical
structure, control of an incident on the ground is dealt with
operationally by the ‘Bronze’ team. The ‘Silver’ team provide
tactical guidance and ensure adequate resourcing for the
‘Bronze’ team. Over the ‘Silver’ level of command lies ‘Gold’
command which exercises strategic control over the incident.
In this outbreak a management system was rapidly
established that partly copied this command structure
and, with modifications in response to the developing
situation, provided the management framework throughout
the outbreak.
During the outbreak it rapidly became apparent that two
teams were needed. One responsible for the investigation
(tactical and operational aspects) of the outbreak, and the
other taking responsibility for strategic management of the
outbreak. This was achieved by separating the investigation
(‘Bronze’ and ‘Silver’) and strategic management (‘Gold’)
arms of the response, with agreed terms of reference and
streams of work for both. The ‘Gold’ team met twice daily and
dealt principally with the media response. The ‘Silver’ team
met once daily. The ‘Gold’ team signed off the daily ministerial
and Department of Health (DoH) briefings and also the media
bulletins, which were issued at regular times twice daily.
This structure and organisation encouraged swift ex-
change of information, allowing the rapid solution of
problems as, or before, they developed. Regular briefings
kept all members informed and ensured rapid and inte-
grated action on operational issues. This approach to
tackling the outbreak was considered a success and is
recommended as a model to be used in future outbreaks.
Surveillance
The CCDC was contacted directly by the microbiologist once
the cause of atypical pneumonia had been established in theearly cases, as the potential wider public health significance
of this diagnosis is generally well known. Thereafter a
programme of active surveillance was set up such that all
hospital admissions for pneumonia were tested for Legio-
nella specific urinary antigen. This surveillance was ex-
tended to the community and local general practitioners
(GPs) were also asked to test patients with signs of atypical
pneumonia. Retrospective serum testing for Legionella
antibody was conducted for all patients hospitalised with
pneumonia three months prior to the date of the first case of
Legionnaires’.
Investigation
The investigation of the outbreak was co-ordinated by the
OCT and comprised microbiological, environmental, and
epidemiological methods. These were carried out co-
temporaneously and the results fed into the OCT.
The microbiological investigation consisted of the rapid
processing of urine and serum samples from suspected cases
to confirm the diagnosis. Clinical isolates and environmental
samples were also sent to reference laboratories to allow
DNA typing to take place with the aim of defining more
closely the exposure pathway.
Environmental investigation was extensive. Firstly, all
known registered cooling towers were visually inspected and
sampled where appropriate. Secondly, all other potential
sources were identified across Hereford by applying local
knowledge as well as some innovative methods such as the
use of thermal imaging by police helicopter to detect
unregistered cooling systems.
The epidemiological investigation consisted of analysing
the daily travel patterns of identified cases around Hereford
in the two weeks prior to onset of illness. This information
was used to target areas of the city for environmental
investigation. Information derived from a literature search
about sources implicated in other outbreaks was also used to
guide the epidemiological investigation.
A key factor in the successful investigation of this incident
was the ability of the OCT to utilise the resources of local
organisations and the wider HPA.
Control and prevention
Potential sites identified by environmental and epidemiolo-
gical investigations were inspected. These sites were
sampled, and where appropriate, control measures insti-
tuted immediately following sampling. The control methods
consisted of cleaning and ‘shock dosing’ by hyperchlorina-
tion. Typically this involved shutting down the cooling
systems to carry out the necessary work.
Roles and responsibilities
The OCT aimed to adopt clear and consistent policies,
however, it was unclear at times what the ‘correct’
procedure was as the evidence base was not robust enough
to answer several questions. Indeed, early on there
was some hesitancy about the respective roles, responsi-
bilities and decision-making accountabilities of the various
agencies involved in the investigation. For example, whose
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Policies were therefore agreed by consensus after discussion
within the OCTand with the advice of national experts. In an
outbreak situation it is necessary to be explicit in advance
about each organisation’s respective roles, responsibilities
and capabilities (Appendix B outlines the roles and
responsibilities adopted by organisations during this out-
break).
In the light of learning from this and other recent
incidents and exercises the HPA is currently working with
the DoH to agree the changes necessary to existing guidance
about organisational roles and responsibilities in the event
of a public health incident.
Engagement with partners
One of the main lessons learned and acted upon early in the
outbreak was the importance of engaging fully with other
agencies and organisations, not only those in the health
community but also the media, police, NHS Direct and the
National Meteorological Office. The benefit of good local
and regional working relationships between key personnel
that had been built up previously over time through regular
meetings and joint training exercises was particularly
noticeable, and resulted in significant resources being
quickly made available to the OCT. Effective communication
with representatives of partner and other organisations
involved in the investigation and management of an
outbreak is crucial to the success of any OCT and this
outbreak illustrated that importance. Partners actively
participated in the organisational, logistical, financial and
communications effort required to investigate and manage
the outbreak. This resulted in the development of a common
strategy and purpose based on a mutual understanding of
the issues involved and knowledge of the local situation. The
shared experience of the outbreak has further facilitated
the engagement of partner organisations in planning and
preparedness activities.
Communication
Communication was a key task from the outset, not only
with the affected community and the wider public, but also
with partner agencies and the wider health community. In an
outbreak situation, a communication strategy should be in
place from the beginning to avoid confusion and ensure that
consistent information is shared in a timely manner both
internally and externally. The first carefully drafted press
statement was released to the media on 7 November and
resulted in intense media coverage that at one stage
resulted in enquiries 24 h a day. The media reacted
extremely quickly and the outbreak was a lead item on
national news media for several days. At the time of the
outbreak there was no regional HPA communications
capacity and no communications strategy for the outbreak.
This meant that the Director of the local HPU team had to
spend considerable time in the initial phase of the outbreak
responding to ad hoc media requests for interviews rather
than leading the investigation and management of the
outbreak. The PCT DPH agreed to act as media spokesperson
and undertake all press interviews. Additionally, the SHAprovided an experienced communications officer and admin-
istrative support to deal with media enquiries. A joint NHS,
LA and HPA press office was established, led by the SHA
communications lead and supported by other SHA commu-
nications officers so that someone was available to respond
to media enquiries 12 h a day.
Key elements of the external communications response
during the outbreak included: press releases timed to
coincide with copy deadlines; a press hotline; press material
on the web; someone available to do live interviews 12 h a
day and a dedicated phone line to the incident room for GPs
and other health staff.
Communication on all aspects of an outbreak and its
impact must be timely. This can be difficult in a rapidly
changing and escalating outbreak situation. Although much
was achieved during this outbreak the HPA is striving to
improve public communications and this has resulted in the
appointment of HPA regional communications managers.
Political considerations
This outbreak led to widespread local anxiety, as well as
social disruption, economic losses and high-level political
attention. As a result, the investigation and control of this
outbreak was very much conducted in public and had to
meet a constant demand for accurate, detailed and timely
information on all aspects of the investigation from a wide
range of interested groups including those within Govern-
ment. It is particularly important that Government spokes-
persons providing information to the public, including
ministers, local politicians and the Chief Medical Officer
are kept well informed and able to explain actions being
taken at the local level during high-profile outbreaks.
However, a significant amount of time and resource was
required to provide ministers and the DoH with adequate
reassurance about the robustness of the local response. This
situation could have been prevented if the strategy for
media and political handling had been agreed at the outset.
Intelligence and information management
Identification of cases relied on active case-finding and the
collection of epidemiological information directly from
patients or a proxy. The HPA RSU established and developed
linked databases and a data management system to keep
track of epidemiological, environmental and laboratory
information. This required considerable time and effort
and successful application of the systems was hindered by
several deficiencies including inadequate capture of labora-
tory data and lack of local information systems support and
resources.
The interpretation of large amounts of travel data was
made possible by the use of GIS software by experienced
personnel from the LA. This was extremely helpful to the
investigation of the outbreak and allowed separate data-
bases to be combined to provide graphical representation of
the location of suspect sites, case movements and resi-
dences. The production of high quality maps greatly aided
the effort to deal with the outbreak and to explain to others
the distribution of cases in relation to suspect sites. GIS is a
useful tool in outbreak investigation and resources are being
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availability of GIS expertise and plume dispersal modelling
at HPA Porton Down was unknown until late in the
investigation. This illustrated the need to ensure that all
local HPU teams are aware of the resources available
centrally and how they may be accessed.
Surge capacity
All levels of the HPA were involved in the response to this
outbreak. HPA staff as well as those from other organisations
worked long hours, including weekends. The experience in
Hereford has demonstrated that during the acute phase of an
outbreak organisations should think about their ability to
rapidly expand the availability of appropriately skilled human
resources. To deal with future outbreaks this would include
ensuring that staff working in various organisations have
specialist training in risk communication, epidemiology, public
health and the use of GIS. There should also be consideration
of the need to ensure sufficient media, laboratory, financial,
administrative and hospital bed capacity.
Key messages
Organisation and coordination Primary Care Trusts need to have resources for major
incident response including a large room to act as an
‘incident centre’ and support staff; Separate teams to manage the incident and conduct the
investigation; Use of a running log enables rapid update for members of
Outbreak Control Team.
Investigation Expertise from the wider Health Protection Agency
resources should be accessed early.
Roles and responsibilities These should be agreed at the outset by agencies forming
the Outbreak Control Team.
Communications Management of the media is crucial to successful
handling of an incident. A dedicated communications
officer is helpful.
Intelligence and information management GIS software is necessary to process detailed travel
information from a large numbers of cases.Conclusions
Despite statutory control measures LD remains a potential
risk to the health of the public and proactive initiatives are
essential for prevention and control. Outbreaks and even
sporadic cases can place a strain on local social, economic,
and health resources and attract media attention. Theinvestigation and management of this outbreak identified a
number of important lessons that are described in this
paper, including the ‘added value’ of an integrated health
protection response and the value of high quality working
relationships with other agencies.
Based on our experience we consider that it is better to
over react at the beginning of an incident and scale back
as catching up is more difficult. This will require a
coordinated, structured and flexible approach that takes
into account delineating roles and responsibilities,
political considerations and communication needs. The
outbreak of LD that occurred in Hereford, West Midlands
UK in 2003 was the single largest outbreak of LD in Hereford
and one of the first to challenge the newly formed HPA. The
lessons learned from this particular outbreak have been
shared within the HPA and externally in order to inform and
improve practice.
Acknowledgements
We gratefully acknowledge the contribution of all those who
participated in bringing this outbreak under control.
Appendix A. Chronology of events associated
with an outbreak of Legionnaires’ disease in
Hereford UK, 20038 October 76 year-old man (Case 1) develops
symptoms13 October Case 1 admitted to hospital
24 October Consultant in Communicable Disease
Control informed of Case 1
25 October Case 1 dies
4 November Case 2 admitted to hospital
6 November Two further cases identified through
active case finding
6 November Outbreak Control Team convened
6 November Strategic Health Agency and Regional
HPA informed
6 November Feature fax to local General
Practitioners
6 November Environmental Health Officers inspect
and revisit all known potential sources
7 November Detailed history taking and
ascertainment of further cases—no
clues about source7 November Press release
7 November Samples taken from factory tower and
tower ‘‘shock chlorinated’’
8–9 November Review of hospital admissions,
preparation of further press statements,
and media (TV, radio, and newspaper)
interviews
Briefing for MP at his constituency office9 November Continued high media interest
9 November Preparations made for use of boardroom
and extra facilities required for next
day11 November Formal press conference at local hotel
11 November ‘Gold/Silver’ control structure set up
with separation of outbreak
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and ‘political’ arm (‘gold’)11 November Tower samples are reported as
presumptive positive for Legionella
pneumophila serogroup 112 November Tower shut down
20 November Date of onset of last confirmed case
(Case 28)
8 December Outbreak declared overAppendix B. Roles and responsibilities of the
organisations involved in responding to the
Legionnaires’ disease outbreak in Hereford in
2003a
Primary Care Trust Chaired the ‘Gold’ group.
 Led the management of the incident.
 Provided local facilities.
 Provided local administrative support to the Outbreak
Control Team (OCT).
 Provided local public health and political background/
advice to other bodies.
 Provided the ‘‘face’’ of the collective response to the
media, and of the local National Health Service (NHS).
Health Protection Agency Chaired the ‘Silver’ group (OCT).
 Investigated and managed the outbreak together with
‘Bronze’ group.
 Marshalled adequate specialist expertise (local Health
Protection Unit and central divisions involved) or pro-
cured it from other bodies. Represented on the ‘Gold’ group by the chair of OCT.
Strategic Health Authority Oversaw the handling of the whole incident.
 Negotiated the ‘Gold–Silver–Bronze’ model of control
and escalation triggers.
 Liaised with the Regional Director of Public Health
(RDPH) and Department of Health (performance and
media lines). Ensured that all necessary media, management/admin-
istrative support was available.
Local Authority Undertook environmental inspections, sampling etc., and
provision of expert environmental advice as part of the
‘Bronze’ group. Provided GIS modelling expertise.
 Provided advice and support on the political and
commercial dimensions.esponsibilities were specific to the Hereford
ay vary in other areas depending upon local Provided expertise and resources for joint media re-
sponse. Represented on ‘Silver’ and ‘Gold’ groups.
Regional Office Ensured that the NHS, HPA and Local Government worked
closely together. Assured proper handling and external communication of
the health aspects of the incident including media
handling. Liaised with Ministers.
 Kept the need for escalation of the level of handling
under review.
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‘Bronze’: Operational level
CCDC: Consultant in Communicable Disease Control
DoH: Department of Health
DPH: Director of Public Health
GIS: Geographic Information System
‘Gold’: Strategic level
HPU: Health Protection Unit
LA: Local Authority
LD: Legionnaires’ disease
NHS: National Health Service
OCT: Outbreak Control Team
PCT: Primary Care Trust
RDPH: Regional Director of Public Health
RSU: Regional Surveillance Unit
SHA: Strategic Health Authority
‘Silver’: Tactical level
